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ABSTRACT 
 
Existing scholarship on categories frequently highlights how some category members may violate 
codes that others diligently abide by. In this paper, we take into account the differences in identity 
across category members, and ask how these relative differences determine their response to a 
code-violating change. Taking a case where category members are clearly identified as ‘insiders’ 
and ‘outsiders’, we argue that insiders’ reaction to a code violation depends upon the extent to 
which they believe their identity to be distinct from the code violator’s, who might be an insider 
or an outsider. Specifically, we suggest that it is the presence or absence of an ‘identity buffer’ – 
i.e., a relative identity advantage – which determines insiders’ reaction. We hypothesize that when 
a code violation is introduced by a fellow category insider, the focal insider will be more likely to 
refrain from the practice. When it is an outsider who introduces the code violation, insiders will 
be more likely to adopt the code violation as long as they can retain an identity buffer. We further 
posit that when outsiders adopt code-preserving behavior, thus narrowing the identity buffer 
between insiders and outsiders, it will mitigate insiders’ likelihood of code violation adoption. We 
test and find support for our hypotheses using data on Islamic banking industry in 12 countries 
(2003-2014). 
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With a double digit annual growth rate over the last twenty years, Islamic banking has 
emerged as one of the fastest growing categories within the global financial industry. Between 
1996 and 2017, the category went from assets worth US$509 billion to over US$1.5 trillion 
(Islamic Financial Services Board, 2017). Islamic banks’ performance appears even more 
impressive when one considers the severe constraints under which they are forced to function – 
including prohibitions on charging interest, or investing in socially undesirable businesses. 
Unsurprisingly, such rapid growth drew interest from conventional banks, many of which 
started Islamic operations over the years. As a result, two distinct types of players now comprise 
the Islamic banking category. These include banks that were ‘born’ as Islamic banks, e.g., Al 
Rajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia, perceived as ‘insiders’ of the industry, as well as Islamic banking 
operations of conventional banks such as HSBC or Deutsche Bank. The latter ventured into 
Islamic banking given the impressive growth of the sector, but despite being in the same 
category, are commonly labelled as ‘outsiders’ because of their conventional, non-Islamic 
parentage. While both these groups claim to offer Islamic banking products, the differences in 
their origins or parentage clearly set them apart within the category. 
In the Islamic banking category, few practices are as controversial as the adoption of 
financial derivatives. Given the potential of derivatives to make risky but more profitable bets 
through speculation, they appeal to category members. However, because of their speculative 
nature, derivatives are considered to be inherently incompatible with Sharia law and understood 
to violate the principles of Islamic banking (El-Gamal, 2001). Therefore, a key dilemma for 
‘insiders’ is whether to adopt derivatives or not as they struggle with questions about how 
adoption will affect their perceived identity as a ‘pure’ Islamic bank. In this paper, we generate 
insights that help us answer when ‘insider’ Islamic banks are likely to adopt derivatives, and 
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whether this becomes more or less likely when the practice is first adopted by an ‘outsider’ bank 
versus a peer ‘insider’. We also examine whether insiders are more or less likely to adopt 
outsider-introduced derivatives when outsiders attempt to appear more like insiders through 
imitation of other practices.  
Change within categories is a significant theoretical phenomenon. Since members are 
expected to follow the category’s central codes if they wish to be accepted as bona fide members 
(Hsu and Hannan, 2005), they are under social pressure to preserve their category identity 
(Polos, Hannan and Carroll, 2002). Identity, therefore becomes a central consideration in a firm’s 
decision to adopt or reject a particular practice that deviates from the category code (Durand, 
Rao, and Monin, 2007; Durand and Kremp, 2016; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak, 2009). This is not to 
suggest, of course, that organizations cannot differentiate themselves (within limits) from their 
peers in pursuit of a competitive advantage (Boone and Özcan, 2016; King, Clemens, and Fry, 
2011; King and Whetten, 2008) but simply to state that navigating between conformity and 
violation of codes is a central challenge for all category members.  
Given the centrality of identity considerations in decisions to conform or violate category 
codes, identity requires greater scrutiny by researchers. However, notwithstanding the important 
insights that have been produced by identity researchers focusing on intra and inter-category 
competitive dynamics (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Baron, 2004; Pólos 
et al., 2002; Smith, 2011), much of this work assumes an essentialist view of identity. In fact, as 
pointed out by King, Clemens, and Fry (2011), the process whereby organizations leverage their 
identities is relational. An organization’s decision to adopt or defy a change introduced by others 
is shaped not merely by its own identity but more importantly by a consideration of the relative 
difference in identity between itself and the change agent (Bourdieu, 1984; Simmel, 1957; Van 
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den Bulte and Joshi, 2007). This point is especially key since hardly any social category is 
entirely homogenous. Many categories, while uniform on the surface, are marked with tensions 
between longstanding members who consider themselves authentic and relatively new entrants 
who may be conspicuous because of their violation of some category codes. These tensions are 
bound to influence how existing category members respond to code violations by those they 
consider as ‘insiders’ and those who are deemed to be ‘outsiders’. In this paper, we ask: how 
does the relative difference in the code-violator’s and the insider’s identities determine a focal 
insiders’ adoption of a new code-violating practice?  
To answer this question, we directly explore the effects of differences in identity and 
compare how response diverge. We first hypothesize that a focal insider will be more likely to 
refrain from adopting the practice when the code violator is a fellow insider. We argue that as 
category members are expected to publicly disapprove any act of deviance and therefore reaffirm 
the category code (Durkheim, 1982), insiders will choose not to support a code violation in such 
a case. On the other hand, when an outsider introduces a profit-enhancing code violation, we 
posit that likelihood of insider engagement with the code violation will rise. Insiders can afford 
to adopt controversial practices as long as they enjoy an ‘identity buffer’ or identity advantage 
over outsiders – i.e., they can take on controversial practices necessary to compete with outsiders 
while keeping their identity as an ‘insider’. In our last hypothesis, we explore what happens 
when this identity buffer is narrowed. We hypothesize that when outsiders publicly adopt code-
preserving behavior, this will mitigate insiders’ likelihood of code violation adoption as the 
buffer between outsider and insider identities narrows.  
We test these theoretical arguments in the context of Islamic banking using a unique 
dataset of 108 Islamic banks in 12 countries over the period 2003 to 2014. In our study, we use 
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two different and widely prominent social codes in the Islamic banking category. We use the 
offering of derivative products as a code-violating practice, and zakat payment – the voluntary 
Islamic practice of alms giving universally associated with Islamic institutions – as an indicator 
of code-preserving behavior. We distinguish full-fledged Islamic banks (born as an Islamic bank) 
as insiders or incumbents, from the conventional bank–owned Islamic banks, which are denoted 
as outsiders or challengers. Additionally, we supplemented our quantitative data with qualitative 
insights into the industry. We conducted 21 open-ended interviews with Islamic bankers, 
lawyers, regulators, and scholars, and we also used books, newspaper articles, industry 
magazines, and bank filings.  
We contribute to existing research in three ways. First and foremost, we take existing 
understandings of the role identity plays in adoption of code violations further by generating new 
insights into how differences in the code violator’s and potential adopter’s identities shapes the 
latter’s response. Second, we contribute to understandings of intra category competition by 
showing how it is not identity per se that shapes competitors’ actions but the existence (or 
absence) of an identity ‘buffer’ that separates those with an outsider identity from those with an 
insider one. Finally, we contribute to social identity theory by revealing how our findings add 
nuance to ideas of in-group favor and out-group discrimination. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Category studies have long held that it is by classifying actors and organizations that 
economic order and stability are maintained (Durkheim and Mauss, 1963: 4; Simmel, 1910). 
Market categories provide audiences with cognitive infrastructure useful in signaling 
commonalities and differences among producers (Schneiberg and Berk, 2010) and in disciplining 
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those who fail to meet with the requirements of category membership (Hannan, Pólos and 
Carroll, 2007; for a review, see Durand and Paolella, 2013).  
Membership of a category comes with an unwritten obligation to abide by certain codes – 
i.e., a set of social rules that category members are expected to adhere to (Durand et al., 2007; 
Hsu and Hannan, 2005). Code preservation is important for attracting attention and garnering a 
favorable evaluation from relevant audiences (Zuckerman, 1999; Hsu et al., 2009; Ody-Brasier 
and Vermeulen, 2014). For example, an exclusive golf club will likely eschew principles of 
inclusiveness and egalitarianism to confine its access to members of a particular class (its 
audience). On the other hand, a human rights NGO will be careful to engage only in activities 
that are compatible with its category membership. As such, organizations generally engage in 
code preservation through maintenance of existing practices or symbolic elements while resisting 
code-violating changes (Micelotta and Washington, 2013).  
Preserving codes, however, does not mean that categories are devoid of internal 
competition and tensions. Intra-category competition in pursuit of competitive advantage pushes 
organizations to create and maintain some differences with their peers (King, Clemens, and Fry, 
2011; King and Whetten, 2008; Durand and Kremp, 2016), albeit within limits of what is 
legitimately considered feasible (Deephouse, 1999). While distinguishing themselves from their 
peers, organizations are careful not to violate central category codes since doing so is fraught 
with risks, including penalties or disfavor of critical audiences (Negro, Hannan, and Rao, 2010). 
Nevertheless, pursuit of competitive advantage does lead firms to push boundaries of what is 
legitimate or desirable (Rao, Durand, and Monin, 2005; Boone and Özcan, 2016).  
This dynamic strengthens particularly when outsiders – not bound by category codes to 
the same extent – enter a category and engage in practices that are profitable though outside the 
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ambit of what is legitimate within the focal category. In such a situation, insiders are faced with a 
dilemma: Do they adopt the controversial practice or resist?  
Making matters more complex is the fact that there might be instances where some codes 
are preserved while others are violated (Durand et al. 2007; Bascle, 2016). For example, a bank 
might preserve certain codes (in order to remain members of the category ‘banks’) but might, at 
the same time, violate others. It is the question of how category members respond to players who 
are both violating as well as preserving codes that interests us.  
IDENTITY AND CODE VIOLATION 
In exploring how identity determines an organization’s reaction to acts of code violation, 
it is important to recognize that identities are not static but in fact dynamic and relational (Mead, 
1934; Goffman, 1979). In other words, organizations take other players’ identities into account 
when formulating or changing their own identity (Hsu, Kocak, and Kovács, 2018; Karthikeyan, 
Jonsson, and Wezel, 2015; Pontikes, Negro, and Rao, 2010). It is thus not difficult to imagine 
that an organization’s decision to adopt a code violation or not is shaped, among other things, by 
consideration of its own identity as well as that of the change agent (Bourdieu, 1984; Simmel, 
1957; Van den Bulte and Joshi, 2007). This notion is also supported by scholars such as Porac 
and colleagues (1995) and Mathias and colleagues (2017) who describe how economic actors are 
influenced by cognitive and social institutions in determining who they consider as their primary 
competitors, and therefore how to react to their actions.  
Understanding identity-driven dynamics within a category requires an appreciation of 
context. For example, depending on the context, a difference of size, status, or a difference in 
location may or may not lead to different identities in the eyes of audiences. When it does, 
however, it is likely to produce different identities (Paolella and Sharkey, 2017; Phillips, Turco, 
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and Zuckerman, 2013). For example, while a school might be much older and established than 
another member of the category ‘schools’, the major difference in the eyes of stakeholders might 
be ownership: state or private.  
When identity differences are based on origins or ownership, members may sometimes 
be categorically divided into ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ (Frake, 2016; McKendrick and Hannan, 
2014). In this case, when it comes to their competitors with an outsider position, insiders often 
believe that they possess what might be called an ‘identity buffer’. In other words, insiders 
consider themselves to be advantaged by virtue of their identity and believe that they will be seen 
as more authentic than outsiders, ceteris paribus. For example, banks might think they possess 
an identity buffer over financial technology startups who are not necessarily seen to belong to the 
category of ‘banks’. Similarly, universities might assert their identity as a bona fide member of 
the category ‘universities’ over a private, online, provider of higher education.  
Scholars have shown that outsiders go to great lengths to close this identity buffer and 
persuade audiences that they should be treated like insiders (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; 
McKendrick and Hannan, 2014). Frake’s (2016) study of brewers engaging in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity is illustrative in this regard where ‘outsider’ members of the category 
were negatively evaluated by audiences who considered them to be driven by money and profits, 
rather than a passion for beer.  
There is much merit to this perception. While both insiders and outsiders can suffer from 
negative evaluations by audiences if they violate central category codes, insiders do enjoy higher 
levels of latitude with their audiences (Hannan et al., 2007). Their category-based collective 
identity accentuates their authenticity claim in the eyes of audiences (Hogg and Terry, 2000; 
Polletta and Jasper, 2001). This means when it comes to competing with outsiders, they can 
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afford to experiment, within limits, without entirely losing the advantage that the insider status 
bestows on them. However, when it comes to competing against other insiders, who possess a 
similar identity, deviation from category codes becomes a different proposition. It is in this vein 
that we examine how focal insiders react to code violation by outsiders as well as insiders.  
INSIDER CODE VIOLATION 
We first examine an instance where the code violator possesses an ‘insider’ identity. 
While traditionally institutional theorists had implied that code-violating changes will be 
initiated from outside the category (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King, 1991), recent work is 
much more open to endogenously generated change (Seo and Creed, 2002; Greenwood and 
Suddaby, 2006). Many studies of such internal changes, driven out of competitive and status 
considerations, though not necessarily defying category codes, do exist (Haunschild and Miner, 
1997; Hsu and Grodal, 2015; Phillips, Turco, and Zuckerman, 2013). For example, Greenwood 
and Suddaby’s (2006) study on big five accounting firms adding law consultation services shows 
how the change benefited the largest firms, whilst the smaller firms were less able to benefit 
from this change.  
However, more often than not, co-membership of a category bestows a shared sense of 
collective identity that keeps members in check (Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, and Quinn, 2013; 
Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Not only audiences but peers too are expected to impose sanctions on 
the deviant (Jensen, 2010). In many cases, the entire category might suffer because of one 
members’ deviance (Paruchuri and Misangyi, 2015; Tieying, Sengul, and Lester, 2008), as an 
individual insider may be seen as representative of the group’s identity and expectations as a 
whole (Hogg and Terry, 2000). As Durkheim (1982) pointed out, while deviance represents an 
act of rebellion, the public disapproval of deviances by peers in fact serves to affirm cultural 
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values and norms prevailing within the category. Furthermore, the act of deviance leads to 
recognition and definition of moral boundaries. In other words, acts of deviance on part of 
category insiders are unlikely to lead to category-wide change.  
Seen from another perspective, in categories where insiders are aware of their privileged 
identity in contradistinction to outsiders, a strong ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March, 1994), 
which emphasizes the importance of ‘doing the right thing’ based on one’s identity, will take 
hold. In a sense, an insider may feel that a deviance must not come from another insider, a notion 
that will persuade the former to desist from imitating the code violation. In doing so, an insider 
protects not only their individual identity from contamination, but also the shared identity of the 
insider group as a whole. In sum, we hypothesize that an insider is likely to refrain from 
following the footsteps of a code-violating peer insider. 
Hypothesis 1: Insiders’ code violation is negatively associated with the likelihood of a focal 
insider to violate the same code. 
OUTSIDER CODE VIOLATION 
Scholars have frequently found code violation to be deployed by de novo, outsider 
members of a category as they are seen to have less to lose compared to insiders (David, Sine, 
and Haveman, 2013; Leblebici et al., 1991). Outsiders possess more freedom to advance their 
cause, as their ‘foreigner’ identity exempts them from similarly stringent expectations of 
conformity by audiences (McKendrick, Jaffee, Carroll, and Khessina, 2003). For example, in 
Rao and colleagues’ study (2003, 2005), age-old culinary traditions were violated by young 
French chefs with little to lose.  
While it is certainly possible to argue – and indeed there is some evidence to support this 
– that ‘insider’ members can choose to ignore code violations by ‘outsider’ members given the 
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latter’s lesser authenticity and the expectation of conformity on part of the former (Negro et al., 
2011), an identity perspective casts this situation in a different light. When the code violation is 
deployed by outsiders, insiders may be able to choose to adopt the controversial practice while 
retaining their insider identity. For example, in Hirsch’s classic article (1986) on hostile 
takeovers, the mainstream banks eventually adopted the highly controversial practice after 
discursively justifying it. Outsiders continue to be seen as outsiders but the practice is adopted by 
those on the inside. In this manner, insiders are able to leverage an ‘identity buffer’ that they 
enjoy over outsiders to adopt the same profitable – albeit code violating – practice. This identity 
buffer is a result of the readily apparent advantage in identity the insiders possess over the 
outsiders. It provides insiders with a cushion against immediate repercussions at the hands of 
audiences, or even latitude to push the boundaries when confronted with ‘evil’ outsider members 
(Hirsch, 1986).  
As Mathias et al. (2017: 2) point out, the entrance of newcomers or outsiders moves the 
strategic emphasis of a category from value creation and cooperation towards value 
appropriation and competition. With the entrance of new members, oppositional collective 
identities may also take root, sometimes helping differentiate a group within a category (Sine, 
Haveman, and Tolbert, 2005; Verhaal, Khessina, and Dobrev, 2015; Weber, Heinze, and 
DeSoucey, 2008). Whether they differentiate themselves or aim to emulate the insiders, the very 
entry and presence of outsiders is likely to alter the dynamic of the category. Acutely aware of 
the identity buffer that they have at their disposal, and recognizing the threat of the new entrants, 
insiders are likely to implement a double standard when following outsiders vis-à-vis peer 
insiders; shifting their overall outlook to one that is based on what March (1994) calls a logic of 
‘consequence’ rather than ‘appropriateness’. Unlike the logic of appropriateness which 
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emphasizes upholding identity expectations, the logic of consequence underlines the importance 
of anticipating future repercussions when deciding which action to (or not) pursue. In short, 
whilst emulating a controversial change introduced by an insider carries the risk of being seen as 
following in the footsteps of a betrayer, doing so with outsiders brings with it a lower possibility 
of prospective sanctions. All in all, an incentive to exploit the identity buffer insiders possess 
over outsiders makes it likely for the former to adopt code violations introduced by the latter. As 
such, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Outsiders’ code violation is positively associated with the likelihood of a focal 
insider to also violate the same code. 
SIMULTANEOUS CODE VIOLATION AND PRESERVATION  
Existing literature suggests that when outsiders enter a particular category, they 
commonly progress in two ways. They either remain peripheral to the mainstream while 
engaging in code-violating practices (McKendrick et al., 2003) or try to assimilate as a full 
member of the category through adoption of code-preserving practices (Jourdan, Durand, and 
Thornton, 2017). However, much of the literature continues to focus on instances where 
outsiders are only violating particular codes, with scant regard to any code preservation that the 
outsider might be undertaking simultaneously. We believe it is crucial to realize that code 
violation and preservation are not mutually exclusive but co-present – that is, challengers can 
deviate on some dimensions whilst conforming on others.  
Identities are not composed of just one element (e.g., country of origin), nor do they 
comprise only a single dimension (e.g., high or low status) – although one dimension can assume 
more salience in some cases. Instead, identities comprise multiple dimensions which intersect 
(e.g., a high status Chinese firm operating in the US, or a Qatari news channel staffed by high 
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status journalists from the West). In other words, identity is relational and changes not along a 
single dimension but any of several. Changes in a focal firm’s identity come about relative to 
competitors’ identities when it adopts or drops particular practices that symbolize various aspects 
of its complex identity.  
For instance, the identity of a microfinance lender might depend upon any, or many, of 
the following: the loan sizes they give, who they lend to, their ownership, their status as a bank 
or NGO, and/or whether they are a for-profit enterprise or not (Roodman, 2012). Within the 
larger category of microfinance institutions, there are several sub-categories including a clearly 
delineated category of incumbents: non-profit microfinance banks (e.g., Grameen). A for-profit 
microfinance bank can enter the microfinance category but continue to be considered an outsider 
by the incumbents. However, the for-profit bank can always try to blend in, at least in the eyes of 
the audience, by adopting other practices associated with category insiders (e.g., by emphasizing 
poverty alleviation, financial inclusion or women’s emancipation). In other words, it is possible 
for outsiders to violate one code while publicly adhering to another.  
In essence, code preservation enables new entrants to appear more authentic and thus 
more easily assimilate into the category. Such a strategy can serve to blur to some extent the 
distinction between outsiders and insiders, increase outsider intrinsic appeal, and serve to meet 
expectations of what it means to be a category member (Jourdan, Durand, and Thornton, 2017). 
Outsiders who code preserve are thus less likely to be discounted and more likely to be accepted 
as an appropriate member. Insiders will perceive code-preserving outsiders as an increased 
threat, as compared to outsiders who do not code preserve. We therefore posit that insider 
response would be conditioned when the outsiders simultaneously code violate and code 
preserve. 
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We are not arguing that preserving another code will remove all difference between 
outsider and insider identities. Rather, we are proposing that preserving other codes while 
violating the focal one will serve to narrow the identity buffer that exists between insiders and 
outsiders. In such cases, insiders face a threat from actors who are different only in some ways in 
the eyes of their audiences. This will leave insiders with lesser space to adopt controversial 
practices while maintaining an identity buffer than they would have had there been no code 
preservation on part of outsiders. In short, when outsiders exhibit code-preserving behavior along 
with code-violation, insiders will be more cautious in adopting the code violating practice out of 
fear that this might result in them completely squander their identity advantage. It is in light of 
these assertions that we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Outsiders’ code preservation will weaken the positive relationship between 
outsider code violation and likelihood of focal insider code violation. 
RESEARCH CONTEXT: ISLAMIC BANKS 
Our empirical setting is the Islamic banking category, which includes all banks claiming 
to offer Islamic banking products. An Islamic paradigm constrains Islamic banks to only obtain 
profit if it adds real value to development of the economy and society as a whole. Instead of 
‘making money from money’ – for instance from keeping money in a bank account and 
accumulating interest – Islamic banking products have to be based on profit-sharing and genuine 
risk-sharing with clients. Table 1 compares the different facets of the conventional and Islamic 
banking. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here  
------------------------------ 
Interestingly, as very few countries have a legal and economic framework designed 
exclusively for Islamic banking, Islamic banks rely largely on category codes to ensure the 
 	
16 
‘Islamicity’ of their products and operations. Given the absence of fully formulated regulation, 
there is interpretive flexibility, but also a fear of consequences if Islamic banks violate widely 
held codes governing the financial transactions. Wilson (1999) provides an illustrative example 
of how socially significant various organizational practices are in the Islamic banking context. 
Wilson describes the case of Kleinwort Benson, an investment bank which set up an Islamic 
investment fund in London in 1986. The fund, which initially operated without a sharia 
supervisory board (SSB) – i.e., a group of Islamic scholars who ensure the compliance of the 
bank to sharia law – found the going very tough, with investors highly reluctant to put their 
money in it. As soon as a sharia board was instituted, however, the fund took off immediately, 
thus confirming the value of visible adherence to industry norms. Hence, the strong normative 
context makes Islamic banking an ideal site to test our hypotheses. 
Conventional-owned Islamic banks as outsiders 
Islamic banks were first founded in the 1970s in Egypt to meet Muslim demands of 
banking according to Quranic wisdom. Their inception was dubbed as the future and only 
alternative to capitalistic, western finance. Since Islamic finance is developed as the antithesis of 
conventional banking, full-fledged Islamic banks are considered the gold standard in terms of 
their compliance with sharia law and are more genuinely engaged in the core values of the 
category. On the other hand, Islamic banks owned by conventional banks tend to be perceived as 
clones of their parents, importing capitalistic values to a religious market. Therefore, the broadest 
and most deeply entrenched distinction between ‘fully fledged’ Islamic banks (insiders) from 
conventionally-owned ones (outsiders) exists in terms of ownership. As we will mention later, in 
their effort to look more Islamic to the relevant audiences, outsiders try to adopt certain visible 
practices that are often associated with being Islamic, but the primary division remains in the 
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form of ownership. With this in mind, we distinguish actors’ central identity feature in the 
Islamic finance category based on ownership structure (as in McKendrick and Hannan, 2014; 
Frake, 2016; Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000).  
In line with understandings widely held in the category, we define Islamic banks that are 
owned by conventional banks as outsiders (henceforth, CB-owned Islamic banks), whereas those 
which are not, as insiders (full-fledged Islamic banks). In essence, full-fledged banks are insiders 
because they were born in the Islamic finance category, whereas CB-owned banks are regarded 
as outsiders because they entered late and are majority owned by conventional banks. In the 
Islamic finance market, ownership by a conventional bank typically signifies more than 90% 
ownership holding by the conventional bank (Figure 1 shows the breakdown percentages of CB-
ownership). In addition, most CB-owned banks carry their parent names (e.g., HSBC Amanah, 
Citibank Islamic). These two considerations make CB-ownership an immediately salient identity 
marker of an outsider firm. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here  
------------------------------ 
As the initial members of an Islamic banking market in a country are always full-fledged 
Islamic banks, when a CB-owned bank enters the market, it is usually received with a certain 
amount of suspicion and displeasure. One of UK’s leading Islamic scholars explains: 
“Things changed when the "rocket scientists of Deutsche Bank", Goldman Sachs, HSBC 
and other big boys arrived on the scene. They saw Islamic finance as an opportunity for 
quick profit. Muftis and Mullahs [Islamic scholars] were hired at footballers' salaries to 
make some of their product "sharia compliant", and bankers such as Irfan [Managing 
Director of a European Islamic bank] to sell them to an unsuspected Muslim public. Soon 
we had products such as sukuk [the equivalent of interest on bonds], hilah contracts [which 
substituted bank charges for interest] and Islamic finance became embroiled in hedge 
funds, derivatives and other dubious instruments justified in the name of Islam.” (Ziauddin 
Sardar, in The Independent, July 2014). 
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Likewise, an Islamic finance lawyer stated in the Financial Times: “With a few honorable 
exceptions, the big international banks don’t intrinsically care about Islamic finance; they saw 
the space as another opportunity to make money” (Wigglesworth, 2009).  
Hence, not only is their motive seen with suspicion, the practices of CB-owned Islamic 
banks in the Islamic finance market are also met with distrust. For example, another Islamic 
scholar remarked how in CB-owned Islamic banks “funds might get mixed up in common 
kitchens” and wondered “if the Islamic banks owned by conventional banks are as zealous or 
passionate about Islamic principles” (Dr Busari Akande, in Charles, 2015). This sentiment was 
echoed by many industry actors whom we interviewed (Table 2 provides representative quotes 
from interviews illustrating various aspects of the industry). Consequently, a ‘pure versus 
impure’ sentiment visibly developed between CB-owned and full-fledged Islamic banks.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here  
------------------------------ 
Derivatives as a code violation 
Two of the strictest prohibitions of Islamic finance are speculation (maisir) and 
preventable uncertainty (gharrar). The idea behind the law is that maisir and gharrar carries a 
risk of a potential unavailability or injustice towards a party. One of the main financial products 
with both components is derivative products. Not surprisingly, these are frowned upon if not 
completely rejected by many Islamic banks. Even though the idea of derivatives has been around 
since the 1970s, there have been few adopters within the Islamic banking category, with most 
Islamic scholars shunning them because they are “inherently incompatible with the principles of 
sharia” (El-Gamal, 2001). In the words of a prominent sharia scholar in Saudi Arabia: 
“Derivatives result in the creation of a pure speculative market totally separated from the 
real economy. This is a destabilizing factor to the world financial system and constitutes a 
threat to humanity. Gambling in the form of derivatives also leads to social disintegration 
and moral decay.” (Dr Sami Al-Suwailem, quoted in Paldi, 2014). 
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Such sentiments were widely echoed by many of our interviewees who underscored the social 
and religious undesirability of derivatives (Table 2). These sentiments were also challenged, 
however, by many CB-owned Islamic banks who openly endorsed derivative products, asking 
many prominent sharia scholars to take a pragmatic approach with them to push for more ‘sharia 
compliant’ derivative products. 
Zakat as a code preservation 
One of the five fundamental pillars of Islam is zakat, the voluntary annual practice of 
almsgiving. The expectation is that every Muslim, earning above a certain threshold (nisab), will 
give about 2.5% of his or her wealth in charity. For an Islamic bank, this will mean a 2.5% ‘tax’ 
on profits or retained earnings paid to a charity or social effort. Unlike other charity or corporate 
social responsibility measures that a Muslim or an Islamic bank can undertake (such as waqf or 
sadaqah), the giving of zakat is continuous every year and at a fixed predetermined rate. Zakat is 
thus a key differentiator across Islamic and conventional banking categories. When asked about 
the importance of zakat giving for Islamic banks, our interviewees immediately noted its 
significance as the most observable variable that showcases the ‘Islamicity’ of the bank (Table 
2). 
In lieu of paying zakat on their own earnings, Islamic banks can choose to be a Zakat 
Centre for its customers and employees, or to pass on the zakat responsibility to their 
shareholders instead. However, if a bank wishes to enhance its ‘Islamicity’ or Islamic identity, 
announcing that it will be paying zakat is a good way of doing it. As one highly senior industry 
figure told us: 
“Take the case of HSBC Ammanah, which is basically an Islamic division of HSBC. I’m 
a shareholder in HSBC myself. So, it’s a bank I know very well, and I know the Ammanah 
people quite well. For HSBC to have its Ammanah division pay zakat is purely a marketing 
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decision. It’s a way of emphasizing its Islamic authenticity. It’s a marketing cost, just like 
advertising would be.” 
 
The person went on to suggest that for other banks such as Citibank it would be no 
different. Indeed, conventional-owned banks tend to publicly declare when they adopt the 
practice of zakat. For example, one CB-owned bank states: “The positive achievement is 
commitment of [the Bank] to disburse the Company’s zakat which will be commenced starting 
from the next year” – thus regarding zakat payment as an important milestone to the Bank. The 
simple act of paying zakat signals commitment to Islamic values of self-sacrifice in lieu of 
capitalist profit maximization. During our interview with an Islamic bank regulator in Jakarta, 
we were told that zakat constituted a “litmus test of Islamic intentions”. He further explained: 
“It is not just about the zakat payable on the balance sheet, but banks that pay [zakat] will 
have to disburse – come to the needy organizations, get published in the news, etc., and 
this gains nice positive publicity.”  
 
Indeed, when searching for newspaper articles on zakat by Islamic banks, local headlines such as 
‘Bank A contributes X amount of zakat to B effort’ or ‘Bank X partners with Y zakat institution 
for Z cause’ are ubiquitous. In all, paying zakat is one of the most observable ways to signal 
serious commitment to the norms of the Islamic banking category, even if not every Islamic bank 
pays zakat. Accordingly, we take the use of derivative products as code violation and the giving 
of zakat as code preservation. 
MEASURES AND METHOD 
Our full data set consists of 143 Islamic banks in 23 countries, covering almost all 
operating Islamic banks today (World Bank, 2016). Of the 143, 101 are full-fledged Islamic 
banks, whereas 42 are conventional-owned. Nonetheless, we ran our main analyses only on 
countries including at least one full-fledged Islamic bank (insider) and one conventional-owned 
Islamic bank (outsider). This sub-sample consisted of 66 full-fledged Islamic banks and 42 
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conventional-owned banks in 12 countries. Our main data sources were annual reports, websites, 
and the Bankscope database. We show examples of the distribution of insider and outsider banks 
in three countries in Figures 2, 3 and 4. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2, 3 and 4 about here  
--------------------------------------- 
Dependent variable. We test predictions about a full-fledged Islamic bank’s likelihood of 
using derivatives with a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the bank adopts derivatives and 0 if 
the bank does not. As derivative usage was and remains a highly controversial practice in Islamic 
banking, only 12.8% of derivative usage amongst full-fledged Islamic banks were observed out 
of total observations.  
Independent variables. The first independent variable is Peer derivative use. We first 
coded whether or not a full-fledged Islamic bank i used derivatives at time t. Peer derivative use 
is then calculated as the count of full-fledged Islamic banks using derivatives in country c at time 
t. Our second independent variable is Outsider derivative use. We coded whether or not a CB-
owned bank i used derivatives at time t and then counted the number of CB-owned Islamic banks 
using derivatives in country c at time t. Prior work has commonly utilized counts of the number 
of some particular type of firm or product (see, e.g., Carroll and Hannan, 1989; Dobrev, 
Ozdemir, and Teo, 2006; Rossman, 2014), based on the argument that the prevalence of an entity 
increases exposure to it, which in turn affects a focal firm’s strategic response. 
Moderator variable. In order to test the third hypothesis, we conducted the same steps to 
calculate Outsider zakat payment as code-preserving behavior. We first coded whether or not a 
CB-owned bank i paid zakat at time t from our data sources. The moderator Outsider zakat 
payment was then calculated as the count of CB-owned Islamic banks paying zakat in the 
country c at time t. 
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Control variables. We used a number of control variables that might affect the likelihood 
of a full-fledged Islamic bank to use derivatives. As derivatives are profitable financial products, 
we first controlled for social aspiration between the focal bank and its competitors by accounting 
for performance differences. To do so, we categorized competitors between insiders and 
outsiders. We thus created the variables Below outsider performance, Above outsider 
performance, Below insider performance, and Above insider performance. We used Returns on 
Assets (ROA) as our main performance variable, given that it is the most commonly used 
measure of social aspiration in the literature (Cusumano, Kahl, and Suarez, 2008). As it is also 
widely available, it can be calculated by most managers and stakeholders and is thus a measure 
that is widely scrutinized. We calculated the difference of performance between the focal firm 
and its competitors, by subtracting the competitor’s average performance from focal firm 
performance, lagged by one year. If the focal firm exhibits superior performance in that year 
compared to its its competitors, we set the difference as Above performance. If the focal firm 
performs below its competitors in that year, Above performance is set to 0 (Cusumano et al., 
2008; Greve, 1998). As for Below performance, we did the opposite; we set the difference 
between the two firms’ performance in absolute value if the focal firm is inferior to its 
competitors and 0 otherwise.  
Further, we included whether or not a full-fledged Islamic bank is publicly listed (Focal 
insider public listing), pays zakat (Focal insider payment of zakat), the count of insiders that pay 
zakat (Insider zakat payment), Profitability as standardized net income, the Size of the bank as 
measured by natural log of assets, and Product count change, which proxies for how innovative 
the bank is in terms of new product development. We also controlled for various types of 
ownership variables that may affect the operating process of the bank, such as the ownership of 
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full-fledged Islamic banks holds by conventional financial institutions (Percentage of 
conventional financial institution ownership) and the percentage of ownership owned by an 
Islamic entity (Percentage of Islamic ownership). We also controlled for the Global Ultimate 
Ownership (GUO) of the bank if it is a government or private entity.  
As our independent and moderator variables are country-specific, we further controlled 
for Total outsider banks and Total insider banks in country c at time t. Moreover, we accounted 
for Muslim percentage of population, GDP growth, and Bank density. Bank density was obtained 
from The World Bank database, which is the total number of commercial bank branches in a 
country divided by 100,000 adults. We used this variable to account for general development and 
competition of the traditional banking sector in the country. Finally, we controlled for year and 
country fixed effects to account for general macroeconomic conditions and country-specific 
regulation. Tables 3 and 4 show descriptive statistics and correlation amongst variables. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Model specifications 
We opted for a random-effects logit model widely used to model binary outcome, with 
‘Islamic bank’ as the cross-sectional unit and ‘year’ as the temporal unit. The random effects 
logistic regression models the individual (bank-specific) probabilities to adopt derivatives. This 
method allowed us to estimate between-firm differences over years as well as time-invariant 
parameters as explanatory variables (e.g., type of ownership, public listing, or country dummies). 
In our case, using a fixed-effects approach would have been inappropriate because our predictors 
had very low within-variance (Allison, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: 244), which meant 
that derivative adoption for more than half of the full-fledged Islamic banks did not vary over 
time. 
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As observations in the longitudinal panel design are not independent, we used clustered-
robust standard errors, which controlled for errors both not distributed identically across firms 
(i.e., heteroscedasticity) and correlated within firms across time periods (i.e., serial correlation) 
(Petersen, 2009: 465). We clustered standard errors by bank group (banks in different countries 
under a single common ownership) – that is, one level above our unit of analysis (as 
recommended in Pepper, 2002) – to account for potential non-independence of decisions by the 
same bank group. In this way we capture the unspecified correlation between observations within 
the same bank group. We ensured against potential issues of multicollinearity by using a 
regression collinearity diagnostic procedure described by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (2004). The 
test on our independent variables yielded a score of 23.10, below the acceptable threshold of 30. 
Further, we computed variance inflation factors (VIF) for all variables in the full model, with the 
average VIF being 7.93, below the standard cutoff of 10 in the literature (Hair et al., 2010). We 
also lagged all our independent and moderator variables by one year to enhance causal inference 
– i.e., we collected data from the year 2003 to construct lagged independent and control variables 
for the first year of observing our dependent variable (2004). 
FINDINGS 
Table 5 displays the results of our random effect logit models. Model 1 shows the effects 
of a base model with controls only. Model 2 includes our independent variable Peer insider 
derivative use, which we find to be negative and significant (β = -1.95, p =0.03). Thus, we find 
support for Hypothesis 1 which predicts a negative relationship between peer insider code 
violation and the likelihood of the focal insider to code violate. Hypothesis 2 proposed that there 
exists a positive relationship between outsider code violation and the likelihood of a focal insider 
to also code violate. Model 3 includes the independent variable Outsider derivative use (β = 2.04, 
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p =0.07) and support Hypothesis 2. It is worth noting that the marginal effects of insiders and 
outsiders on to the baseline probability are similar in maginitude. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here  
------------------------------ 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive relationship between outsider code violation and 
the likelihood of a focal insider to also code-violate is weakened when the outsider engages in 
code preservation. Model 4 tests this prediction with the interaction of the independent variable 
Outsider derivative use with Outsider zakat payment. Our results indicate that the interaction 
between the two variables is negative and significant (β =-0.38, p <0.01), lending support to our 
third hypothesis. Figure 5 depicts the interaction between Outsider derivative use and Outsider 
zakat payment. As can be seen, as more outsiders pay zakat, it would take more outsiders using 
derivatives for a focal insider to follow suit. We also ensure that the change in values of Outsider 
derivative use are statistically significant at various values of Outsider zakat payment to verify 
that the relationship between the independent and dependent variable does vary across different 
levels of the moderator. In all, our findings support our conjecture that insiders are more cautious 
to deviate when outsiders exhibit both code-violating and code-preserving behaviors. 	
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 about here  
------------------------------ 
Robustness checks and supplementary analyses 
We carried out several robustness checks and supplementary analyses to confirm our 
results. First, the random-effects estimator makes the assumption that observed variables 
(regressors) are uncorrelated with the unobserved variables (error term). We thus corrected for any 
potential correlation by using Mundlak’s procedure (1978), extended by Wooldridge (2002), that 
estimates random-effects regression models by adding entity-means of variables (Greene and 
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Hensher, 2010: 71, 281-283). For each entity, we computed the time-averaged values and ran 
random-effects models with the time-invariant variables. We then ran Model 4 with these 
additional variables. As can be seen in Model 5 Table 6, we obtained the same results. 
Additionally, in models not shown, we also ran Models 1-3 with the Mundlak procedure and 
confirm our results remain the same for these models as well. We are thus confident that our 
findings are robust from potential correlation between the regressors and the error term. 
Second, while the use of a count measure for Outsider derivative use and Outsider zakat 
payment is appropriate both theoretically and methodologically, we recognize that the correlation 
between the two variables is high (0.71). Even though this does not necessarily indicate 
problematic collinearity issues especially as our regression collinearity diagnostic procedure still 
measures under 30 (Belsley et al., 2014), we opted to verify our results by using an alternative 
variable with a lower correlation. Specifically, we ran Model 4, but instead of using a count 
measure for Outsider zakat payment, we use a proportion measure, which is calculated by 
dividing the count of outsiders which pay zakat in country c in year t with the total count of 
outsiders in country c in year t. The correlation between Outsider derivative use and the 
proportional measure of outsiders paying zakat is 0.26. We obtain the same results in models not 
shown but are available upon request. 
Third, we tested Hypothesis 1 in countries without any conventional-owned Islamic 
banks to check if our theorizing holds in countries with only full-fledged Islamic banks or 
insiders. In this sample of insider-only countries, 35 Islamic banks were spread out in 11 
countries between year 2003-2014. As derivative adoption is rarer in this sample compared to the 
full risk set (only 6.01% of observations, which is less than half the rate for countries with both 
insiders and outsiders), we adjusted our logit model. We acknowledge that standard logit 
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estimates would be biased when the unconditional probability of a binary event is low (King and 
Zeng, 2001). Hence, as is conducted by Rider and Tan (2014), we corrected coefficient estimates 
and standard errors to account for the systematic bias related to the dependent variable’s low 
unconditional mean using a rare-events logit specification (King and Zeng, 2001). We show 
results in Table 6, with Model 6 for insider-only countries. We confirm that Peer insider 
derivative use (β=-3.21; p=0.03) remains negative and significant in insider-only countries. This 
buttresses support to the idea that the Islamic banking category with only insiders may be more 
likely to exhibit a community-like structure, where members are more committed to the values of 
the category and code violators are more likely to be penalized (Mathias et al., 2017). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here  
------------------------------ 
Fourth, we accounted for the possibility that it is the increasing legitimacy of derivatives 
rather than the identity of the code violator that drives our results. In other words, when 
derivatives are increasingly accepted, full-fledged Islamic banks could code violate because they 
do not expect penalties any more. To measure Derivatives legitimacy, we utilized the media 
dataset Factiva (following Hsu and Grodal (2015) who also use media-based variables to 
measure the level of legitimacy). We first searched for the keywords ‘derivative’ or ‘derivatives’ 
selecting the Islamic banking industry and found 729 articles between 2007 and 2014 (we were 
not able to gather articles for all the countries and all the years). We then coded for counts of 
articles in each country c in year t. Further, we counted how many articles were positive or 
neutral in tone when referring to derivatives in Islamic finance (i.e., derivatives are making 
developments or are being introduced), vis-à-vis articles that were negative in tone (i.e., 
derivatives are still not permissible or haraam). One author and a graduate research assistant 
familiar with Islamic finance performed the coding for the article tone. The reliability of the 
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coding was tested on a random sample of 80 articles with 93.75% of the judgment matching 
between the two coders. Derivatives legitimacy was then calculated as the proportion of positive 
and neutral articles, which is the count of positive and neutral articles divided by the total articles 
in country c and year t. As can be seen in Model 7, our main results still hold even when 
controlling for derivatives legitimacy. It is worth noting that the variable Derivatives legitimacy 
while positive (β = 0.04, p = 0.99) – which is what one would expect – is insignificant. We also 
confirm that our results continue to hold when we control for the counts of positive and neutral 
articles together with the counts of all articles, instead of using a proportion measure (model not 
reported).  
Fifth, a potential explanation for our work could be that it is bank status rather than 
identity that is driving our results. In other words, it may be the case that a focal insider would be 
more likely to code violate because it has lower or higher status (Rao et al., 2005; Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 2001). We thus undertook an analysis to disentangle the two constructs of identity 
and status and isolate the effects of each.  
Based on our background research, it became evident to us that an Islamic bank’s status 
is at least partially determined by its sharia supervisory board (SSB) composition. The SSB is a 
board consisting of sharia scholars who ensure that an Islamic bank’s products and practices are 
in accordance with sharia law (Wardhany and Arshad, 2012). Although having a SSB is 
common, there is a shortage of expert scholars worldwide which are able to combine both sharia 
and finance expertise. As a consequence, the relatively small number of expert sharia scholars – 
usually from Middle Eastern countries – tend to sit on multiple boards of Islamic banks 
worldwide. Having a high-status sharia scholar on one’s board indicates a bank’s status, in the 
sense that such banks were able to attract the most in-demand scholars. It also further strengthens 
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a bank’s status, as these scholars represent a highly visible symbolic endorsement of the bank, 
similar to the way in which high-status venture capital firms serve to bolster the status of early 
stage ventures with which they are affiliated (Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999). 
To measure bank status, we created a Bonacich centrality score for each scholar in a 
bank’s SSB. This was done by creating a symmetrical matrix of all 380 scholars in our dataset 
per year to account for overlaps in bank directorship between any two scholars. We inserted the 
matrices into UCINET, which then calculated the centrality scores. We then summed the 
normalized score of SSB members for each bank-year.  
In our full sample which included both full-fledged and CB-owned banks, the correlation 
between status and conventional banking ownership is low (-0.05). In order to examine the effect 
of status, we replicated Model 4 of Table 5 and additionally included the variable status of the 
focal insider. We find that our main results strongly hold and that there is a positive but 
insignificant effect of a bank’s status (β=0.01; p=0.84) as shown in Model 8 of Table 6. It is 
worth noting that we were unable to gather complete information on all banks’ SSB members for 
all the bank-years in our sample, especially for the earlier years (2003-2006). This is why we did 
not control for status in our main models and why the number of observations in Model 8 is 
lower. Nonetheless, we are fully confident that our models are robust to the alternative 
explanation that it might be status rather than identity which is driving our results.  
Lastly, as our third hypothesis states, simultaneous code violation and preservation would 
narrow the identity buffer amongst insiders and outsiders. One might then wonder whether 
identity buffers also exist within insider peers? In other words, could it be that insiders who pay 
zakat will possess an identity buffer against insiders that do not. We suggest that this is unlikely 
and that the identity buffer exists only when the difference in the core differentiating feature 
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(ownership) is readily apparent as in the case of full-fledged versus CB-owned banks. On the 
other hand, fellow insider banks will be perceived as possessing a shared identity and a sense of 
community (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Below, we present suggestive evidence that we believe 
bolsters our case. 
First, among insiders, it is assumed that even if the bank does not pay zakat, the 
individual shareholders must – an assumption that does not extend to CB-owned banks. Also, in 
line with recent research (Platonova et al., 2018: 464), we find that when insiders pay zakat, they 
are less likely than outsiders to showcase it “because it shows worship to God and showing it off 
will go against that” (interview with Malaysian full-fledged Islamic banker). We ran a test on the 
count of the word ‘zakat’ in all Islamic bank’s annual reports in the year 2013-2014, where the 
annual reports are generally more uniform in length and detail. The word count is illustrative in 
our setting because banks choose the extent to which they highlight their zakat efforts in their 
annual report. For example, whilst many banks only mention the amount of zakat paid with a 
standardized template-like accounting note, others go further by discussing where they 
distributed their zakat. We find the mean zakat word count of a full-fledged bank to be 7.15 (7.15 
times the word ‘zakat’ is mentioned per annual report), whereas the mean for CB-owned banks is 
14.8 (14.8 times the word ‘zakat’ is mentioned per annual report). This difference is also 
statistically significant (p (|T| > |t|) = 0.000), indicating that insiders are less likely to parade 
their code-preserving efforts than outsiders. This suggests that outsider banks are more likely to 
adopt code-preserving practices as impression management strategies (Goffman, 1959), which is 
in line with Peterson’s (2005:1083) claim that authenticity tends to be proclaimed more strongly 
when it is called into question. 
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Second, we ran Model 2 but added the interaction Focal insider zakat payment (whether 
or not the focal insider pays zakat) with Insider derivative use (unreported model). We find no 
significance of the interaction, which supports our argument that payment of zakat does not 
redeem insiders when they code-violate. All in all, it seems that for insiders, zakat is not a 
strategic tool to prove authenticity as it is for outsiders.  
DISCUSSION 
Recent work in the organizational categories literature has shown how, given the 
changing nature of competitive threats that they face, organizations are continuously torn 
between conformity to category codes and an imperative to be distinct (Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, 
and Miller, 2016; Zuckerman, 2016). Within this scholarship, a strengthening stream of research 
has been exploring how such decisions are influenced by considerations of organizational 
identity, both of incumbents and new entrants (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; McKendrick and 
Hannan, 2014). Given the rapidly blurring industry boundaries (Kovács and Hannan, 2015; 
Kuilman and Li, 2009), an increasing number of firms are facing identity-based challenges. For 
example, as autonomous cars become a reality and individuals stop driving cars, established 
manufacturers such as BMW (“the ultimate driving machine”), might be left wondering about 
their identity in a world of driverless cars. Similarly the entry of Amazon into healthcare might 
cause an existential crisis amongst healthcare providers. Understanding competitive behavior in 
the face of category members with different origin/ownership-based identities who may be 
violating some category codes while preserving others is perhaps more crucial now than ever 
before. 
It is in this vein that we use our extensive data on insiders and outsiders in Islamic 
banking to explore how different identities shape dynamics of change and competition within 
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categories. In a case where category boundaries and codes are clearly laid out, and intra-category 
identities easily discernable, we first test what response a category code violation elicits. We find 
that a focal insider would be less likely to adopt a code violation when the category is 
homogenous and the code violator is a peer insider. We argue that this happens because 
expectations of loyalty to the category code are higher for insiders, leading them to desist from 
following a deviant. It also implies that radical innovation rates should drop when categories are 
homogeneous. We find the opposite effect when the code violator is an ‘outsider’ member of the 
category. In this case insiders are more willing to adopt a code violation. We argue that the 
identity buffer insiders possess relative to outsiders allows them some leeway to adopt 
controversial practices while retaining their insider identity. This implies that the entry of 
outsiders is beneficial for radical innovation in any industry though for incumbents it means 
dealing with identity challenges. In our last hypothesis, we examine what happens when the 
outsider code violator adopts some code-preserving practices. This hypothesis was posed to test 
how the outcome changes as the identity buffer narrows. Consistent with our overall argument, 
we find that as soon as the identity buffer narrows, the insiders’ propensity to adopt the code 
violation ushered in by outsiders also weakens. Our findings hold significant implications for 
existing understandings of market categories as well as organizational and social identities. 
Identity, Categories, and Change 
It is now established that category members tend to keep their and competitors’ identities 
in mind when making strategic decisions (Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum, 2009; Pontikes et al., 
2010). Likewise, competitive dynamics can lead to changes in the identities different category 
members lay claim to (King et al., 2011; Karthikeyan et al., 2016). It is not only individual 
identities, but shared ones too which are instrumental in shaping strategic decisions. For instance, 
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Ingram and Inman (1996) described how national identities, and hence sense of allegiance, 
shaped the competitive behavior of Canadian and American hotels in the Niagara Falls area. 
Likewise, the entry of new players can lead incumbents to shift their own identities, as we saw in 
the cases of charter schools (King et al., 2011) and medical dispensaries (Hsu et al., 2018). King 
and colleagues (2011) suggest that outsiders are better able to drive changes in incumbent 
behavior thanks to the new templates they bring with them. McKendrick et al. (2003) find that 
high status organizations are able to advance change more easily. And in one of the most recent 
studies on this phenomenon, Hsu et al. (2018) suggest that the adoption of code violations by 
insiders depends upon whether audiences accept the new practices.  
While most studies, at least to our knowledge, look at a single instance of confrontation – 
generally between insiders and outsiders – in order to observe shifts in identity, we are able to 
empirically test two scenarios (when code violation is deployed by insiders versus outsiders) in 
the same empirical context. While, on the face of it, one may interpret our findings as suggesting 
that those with an outsider identity are advantaged in terms of change creation, we are in fact 
going beyond this inference (which is based on identity itself) by focusing on the role identity 
differences plays in members’ decisions to adopt a code violation or not. We argue that when a 
discernible identity difference between violator and potential adopters does not exist – as in the 
case when the code violator is a peer insider – insiders are reluctant to adopt code violations. 
When an identity difference does exist between the violator and potential adopters – as in the 
case of a code violation by an outsider – insiders are more likely to leverage the identity buffer 
they possess to adopt code violations.  
Realizing the centrality of intra-category identity differences to category dynamics casts 
existing understandings in new light. While we already know that the entry of code-violating 
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newcomers into a category leads to a shift in incumbents’ focus, our notion of an identity buffer 
alerts us to the fact that any attempt on the newcomers’ part to decrease or increase the 
difference between itself and potential adopters is likely to have a meaningful effect on the 
latter’s likelihood of adopting the code-violating practice. By focusing on identity differences 
rather than identity itself, we move from considering binaries (American versus Canadian; 
Classical versus Nouvelle, etc.) to a spectrum where identities are malleable and relative. Our 
consideration of two different practices – derivatives and zakat – opens up new avenues to 
exploring multi-dimensional identity differences as well as changes in the identity buffer that 
exists between firms, and their effect on competitive outcomes or firm behavior in general.  
Another aspect of our research worth highlighting is how code-changing and code-
preserving strategies can be of varying prominence (March, 1954; Bascle, 2016; Wry, Cobb, and 
Aldrich, 2013), depending on the actor deploying it. In our context, adopting zakat seemed to be 
an effective strategy for outsiders to blend in to the category, but does not carry the same 
distinction for insiders. Further, it became clear to us based on background research that adoption 
of derivatives was one of the most contentious issues in the Islamic finance community, 
overshadowing many other potential code violating issues. It remains a theoretical puzzle as to 
why some code behaviors generate a great deal of attention, whilst others seem to be ignored. 
We are convinced that specifying the reasons would be an exciting avenue for future research. 
Identity Buffer and the Quest for Competitive Advantage 
In the previous section, we discussed how our study sheds new light on the role of 
identity differences in organizational decisions to conform or deviate from category codes. We 
now describe how we also enhance existing understandings of identity-based core competences. 
The notion that distinctive identities serve as a basis for competitive advantage is not new in 
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itself (Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Smith, 2011). For instance, as far back as 1991, Fiol (1991) wrote 
that identity needed to be considered a ‘core competency’ of organizations. Fiol argued that 
organizational identity was central to how managers viewed competition and themselves, and 
how they allocated resources. Ten years later, she questioned her earlier conclusion, however, 
suggesting that no one identity could continuously serve as a basis for competitive advantage 
(Fiol, 2001). In a dynamic environment, she argued, competitive advantage needs to be renewed, 
and the continuously changing bases for competitive advantage in turn requires a fluid identity 
(Fiol, 2001). Given the increasing proclivity of organizations to breach category boundaries as 
ecosystems evolve, questions of how identity figures in competition between incumbents and 
new entrants have only assumed greater relevance. Navigation of how much to shift one’s 
identity is never straightforward (Karthikeyan et al., 2016; King et al., 2011). This is also 
emphasized, for instance, by Navis and Glynn (2010) who state that within a collective identity, 
organizations go on to claim an identity of “optimal distinctiveness – distinctive enough from 
other members to individuate it, but not so distinctive as to make it unrecognizable as a rightful 
member of the category” (Navis and Glynn, 2010: 442).  
Our results underline the importance of considering identity in the context of intra-
category competition. However, our study suggests that contrary to what much earlier research 
emphasizes (Negro et al., 2011) it is not identity per se which serves as a core competence for the 
firm. Rather, it is the identity buffer, i.e., relative identity advantage, which they possess, that 
influences their strategies. Specifically, when competing against organizations with a markedly 
different identity, organizations compete on their identity advantage (buffer). However, when 
competing against organizations with a similar identity, they cannot compete on this basis. This 
would suggest that when, say, university publishers (e.g., Stanford University Press) compete 
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against ‘trade’ publishers, they may leverage the identity buffer they possess over the latter. This 
could mean adoption of certain practices that are not in line with their ‘university publisher’ 
identity. When competing against other university publishers, however, there is no identity 
buffer to leverage, likely resulting in continued conformity to the codes of their category. In this 
sense, our study underscores the importance of taking relative identity gaps into consideration 
rather than binary identities.  
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that our focus on organizational identity, in particular, 
was motivated by the theoretical observation that competition between different identities can 
lead to an identity partition or the creation of a subcategory within a category (Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 2000; McKendrick and Hannan, 2014). As the partitioning allows for a change in 
the category’s dynamics, it enables the existence of a ‘double standard’ to be enacted across 
different identities with insiders employing different strategies against insider peers than they do 
against outsiders. We also recognize that there is a limit beyond which the buffer will not protect 
the organization if it violates the code. This is also implied by Phillips, Turco, and Zuckerman 
(2013) who argued that while high status actors are more able to engage in deviance, they will 
not go extents that might discredit them.  
Social identity theory 
Social identity theory argues that organizations can be a part of a “psychological group, 
defined as a collection of people who share the same social identification or define themselves in 
terms of the same social category membership” (Turner, 1984: 530). Theoretically, social 
identity theory distances itself from the traditional concept of categories by suggesting that social 
group membership can exist in the absence of shared goals or features, so long as the 
organization cognitively internalizes some common beliefs or perceives and shares a ‘common 
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fate’ with other members (Cornelissen, Haslam, and Balmer, 2007; Rabbie, Schot, and Visser, 
1989). Having said this, identification to the group will likely be stronger when the group 
possesses distinctive or unique features in relation to others and when they are aware of the 
salience of an out-group (Haslam and Ellemers, 2005).  
A long sequence of research in this literature has established that producers tend to favor 
those within their group and discriminate against those outside. Moreover, this in-group favor 
intensifies when there exists competition between in and out- groups as “us against them” 
sentiments are accentuated (Ashforth and Mael, 1989). For example, Cannella, Jones, and 
Withers (2014) point out how family firms tend to favor board interlocks with other family firms 
and hire board members with family firm experience for longer periods. In another study, 
Haslam et al. (2001) noted that corporate leaders were viewed as more charismatic when leading 
the firm through a crisis if they affirmed and promoted their in-group identity, independent of 
actual organizational performance. Members of an in-group may even sacrifice resources to 
ensure that distinctiveness with out-groups is maintained, rather than risking potential fuzziness 
between the groups’ boundaries (Haslam and Ellemers, 2005; Turner, Brown, and Tajfel, 1979).  
Our work sheds light on the caveats of in-group favoritism and its consequences. We 
argue that loyalty to in-group values does not necessarily translate into sustained favoritism 
towards other in-group members. On the contrary, it can lead in-group members to be stricter 
towards an in-group member seeking to introduce a controversial practice that goes against the 
group’s values. By doing so, in-group members reaffirm the boundaries of their group and may 
perhaps ensure its survival in the long run. This becomes especially pertinent in our case when 
we consider that full-fledged Islamic banks are unable to defect from their category. In this way, 
our work supports the argument that the foundations of social groups are not solely to uphold a 
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positive shared identity but can also be reinterpreted as rational behavior aimed at maximizing 
both individual and group interests (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Like most studies, ours too carries its own set of limitations. First, while we recognize the 
multi-dimensional nature of identity, our measures of code violation and preservation are in 
themselves binary. We believe future work should measure more variation in the forms of code 
adoption. Future researchers are encouraged to explore adoption along a spectrum. How do firm 
characteristics affect the legitimation of contentious social code violations? How does a focal 
firm’s grade of membership (a pure player at the core versus a peripheral player) in the category 
predict the types of code violation and preservation a firm might engage in? These questions 
open up exciting and important avenues for future inquiry. 
Second, another possible avenue of inquiry could be the exploration of the antecedents of 
code-violating or -conforming behavior, especially for outsiders. In our context, we were not 
able to fully mine data on the social position of outsiders in their original category. Ideally, we 
would have liked to understand how a CB-owned banks’ identity in the conventional banking 
category might affect the several possible ways in which it could choose to enter Islamic 
banking. Given that we still lack a robust understanding of how outsiders’ previous category 
‘life’ affects their trajectory in the new category, it could be particularly fruitful to investigate  
which new entrants are more likely to be code violators or code preservers.  
Finally, a boundary condition of our study is that derivatives are profitable financial 
products for banks. It would be exciting to study how firms’ strategy could change when the 
code violation deployed is more neutral or uncertain in its potential economic gains. For 
example, when new technological standards first emerge, their success is unclear and adoption 
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can be risky. How do members assess the code violation in such cases? How does the uncertainty 
impact their actions? What are the social codes that would be salient in such instances? Future 
work could address whether firms react differently with such offerings. 	  
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TABLE 1. Islamic Banking versus Conventional Banking 
 
  Islamic Banking Conventional Banking 
Guiding Principles Religious principles Capitalistic, market-based principles 
Prohibitions Accumulating interest, 
speculation, unethical or socially 
undesirable projects, and other 
illegal practices as outlined by 
financial law 
Illegal practices as outlined by financial 
law 
Role of Bank A partner who shares risk with 
borrower A lender who is assured a rate of return 
Purpose Profit making that is ethical, 
appeases God, and creates real 
value for society 
Maximization of profit to appease 
shareholders 
Top Management 
Team 
Board of Directors and Sharia 
Supervisory Board Board of Directors 
Products Mudarabah (profit-sharing loan), 
Musharakah (joint enterprise), 
Murabahah (markup sale), Istisna 
(contract with deferred delivery), 
Ijara (lease), Wadiah (deposit), 
etc. 
Loans, Mortgage, Deposits, Savings, 
Checking accounts, etc. 
Penalties Does not penalize its borrowers 
for late payments Penalizes borrowers for late payments 
Relations with Wider 
Community 
Gives due importance to public 
interest. Its’ ultimate aim is to 
ensure inclusive growth by 
providing needed capital to 
socially desirable projects 
Bringing together those who need 
capital and those who possess it 
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TABLE 2. Qualitative Insights from the Islamic Banking Industry 
Proposition Sub-proposition Representative Quotes 
CB-owned banks are viewed as 
outsiders 
CB-owned banks are seen to imprint the 
capitalistic logic of their owners on Islamic 
products 
"The ownership of the bank is the captain of the bank. Who do they 
[CB-owned banks] answer to? The [conventional bank] directors. 
That determines where that ship goes." (Interview with former full-
fledged Islamic bank executive)  
  
"If you ask them (a CB-owned bank top management team) about a 
fatwa, they probably wouldn't know. They're all imports (from the 
conventional bank). 70% of their employees are." (Islamic finance 
scholar)  
CB-owned banks are seen as less loyal 
towards Islamic values 
"I am just not sure whether they share the same devotion to Islam or 
they just want to make more money." (Interview with full-fledged 
Islamic bank, former Finance Director) 
  
"Islamic finance is about a balance between the sharia side and the 
finance side. The CB-owned banks need to go that extra mile on the 
sharia side." (Interview with SSB member of CB-owned bank) 
Derivatives are considered to 
be controversial 
 
"Derivatives have a bad name around here [in the Islamic finance 
sector], especially after the financial crisis that the Western world 
created. It's a system of buying into risk and using riba [interest] in 
every transaction." (Interview with Islamic banker, Head of Product 
Compliance Dept.)    
"The risk [of violating sharia] is there. But if the guidance sharia 
scholars give goes in the direction of ‘I want the purest market’, then 
I am convinced there will be no market." (Head of Deutsche Bank 
Islamic Finance, quoted in Al Arabiya News, August 2009) 
Zakat as a visible proxy of 
‘Islamicity’ 
 
"Every year, Islamic bankers they like to publicize where their zakat 
was distributed. The fakir [poor], the masakin [needy], or the admins, 
it's up to the bank. It's good publicity, especially within the Islamic-
based industry." (Interview with Islamic banker, Human Resources 
and Learning Dpt.)    
"Zakat is not charity and it's not supposed to be seen as a tax, like 
many do. It is a responsibility that Islamic banks have as an Islamic 
institution. They are the ones who need to pay it for God, although 
God doesn't need their charity." (Islamic finance scholar) 
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TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1. Focal insider derivative use 0.13 0.33 0 1 
2. Outsider derivative use 0.73 2.49 0 11 
3. Peer insider derivative use 0.63 0.95 0 4 
4. Outsider zakat payment 1.29 2.26 0 10 
5. Above outsider performance 0.01 0.04 0 0.37 
6. Below outsider performance 0.07 0.18 0 1.57 
7. Above insider performance 0.02 0.05 0 0.96 
8. Below insider performance 0.02 0.06 0 0.96 
9. Publicly listed 0.48 0.5 0 1 
10. Focal insider zakat payment 0.5 0.5 0 1 
11. Insider zakat payment 2.78 2.35 0 9 
12. Profitability (std) 0 1 -3.79 5.01 
13. Size (ln assets) 6.89 1.55 -0.63 11.02 
14. Product count change 0.23 0.6 0 5 
15. Conventional F. I. ownership 0.05 0.11 0 0.47 
16. Islamic ownership 0.41 0.37 0 1 
17. GUO: Government 0.1 0.3 0 1 
18. GUO: Private entity 0.14 0.34 0 1 
19. Total outsiders in country 2.36 2.67 0 12 
20. Total insiders in country 7.54 4.1 1 15 
21. Muslim percentage 77.43 19.95 3.3 99.09 
22. GDP growth 4.1 3.9 -15.09 17.32 
23. Bank density 9.14 6.08 1.52 26.45 
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TABLE 4. Pairwise Correlations 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. Derivative                       
2. Peer insider derivative use 0.33                      
3. Outsider derivative use 0.44 0.56                     
4. Outsider zakat payment 0.44 0.57 0.71                    
5. Above outsider performance -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.14                   
6. Below outsider performance 0.03 0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14                  
7. Above insider performance -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 0.26 0.02                 
8. Below insider performance -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.39 -0.10                
9. Publicly listed -0.11 -0.10 -0.26 -0.29 0.13 -0.15 0.01 -0.10               
10. Focal insider zakat payment 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.24 0.02 -0.24 -0.04 -0.13 0.20              
11. Insider zakat payment -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.11 -0.17 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.32             
12. Profitability, std. 0.27 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.10 -0.18 0.04 -0.16 0.22 -0.05 -0.06            
13. Size (ln assets) 0.36 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.00 -0.25 -0.04 -0.27 0.38 0.10 -0.01 0.49           
14. Product count change 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.11          
15. Financial inst. own. 0.09 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.09 -0.12 -0.23 0.09 0.03 -0.07 0.08         
16. Islamic own. -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.14 -0.18 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.21        
17. GUO: Govt. 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.06 -0.08 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.12 0.06 0.10 -0.05 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.12       
18. GUO: Private entity 0.14 0.30 0.50 0.54 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 -0.24 -0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.02 -0.14 0.29 -0.13      
19. Total outsiders in country 0.40 0.53 0.70 0.74 -0.12 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 -0.29 0.23 0.10 -0.07 0.09 0.13 -0.08 0.14 0.09 0.50     
20. Total insiders in country -0.10 0.01 -0.16 -0.17 -0.08 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.51 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.21 -0.13 -0.05 -0.10 -0.11    
21. Muslim percentage -0.25 -0.29 -0.22 -0.09 0.10 -0.70 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.24 0.29 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 0.08 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10 0.02   
22. GDP growth -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.04 0.14 -0.23 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 -0.12 0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.10  
23. Bank density 0.23 0.27 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.42 0.03 -0.02 0.11 -0.19 -0.48 0.14 0.23 0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.49 -0.62 -0.10 
 
 
 	
50 
TABLE 5. Random Effects Logit Estimations: Likelihood of Insiders’ Derivative Use 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
VARIABLES Controls H1 H2 H3 
Peer insider derivative use  -1.95* -1.92* -2.05* 
  (0.895) (0.919) (1.006) 
Outsider derivative use    2.04+ 4.47* 
   (1.142) (1.743) 
Outsider derivative use x outsider zakat payment    -0.38** 
    (0.145) 
Outsider zakat payment  2.14 0.94 5.21** 
  (1.389) (1.622) (1.965) 
Above outsider performance 8.31 2.18 4.29 11.98 
 (11.639) (10.733) (11.685) (16.167) 
Below outsider performance -0.11 -0.93 -1.14 -0.18 
 (2.862) (2.760) (2.773) (3.104) 
Above insider performance 8.73* 7.67* 7.10 4.46 
 (3.799) (3.618) (8.264) (13.489) 
Below insider performance -36.11** -31.68* -34.96** -26.80+ 
 (12.099) (13.892) (11.225) (14.965) 
Focal insider public listing -7.24* -6.19** -7.10** -6.88** 
 (2.850) (2.192) (2.369) (2.342) 
Focal insider payment of zakat 1.86 1.51 1.60 0.63 
 (1.211) (1.040) (1.082) (0.969) 
Insider zakat payment -0.03 -0.51 -0.36 -1.66** 
 (0.429) (0.365) (0.344) (0.638) 
Profitability 0.09 -0.27 -0.27 -0.05 
 (0.530) (0.518) (0.518) (0.560) 
Size 3.83*** 3.11*** 3.60*** 3.56*** 
 (1.022) (0.768) (0.946) (0.953) 
Product count change -0.22 -0.18 -0.35 -0.39 
 (0.649) (0.768) (0.762) (0.714) 
Percentage of conventional F.I. ownership 15.18* 11.74* 12.97* 13.24* 
 (6.250) (5.269) (5.601) (5.536) 
Percentage of Islamic ownership -0.56 -0.68 -0.96 -0.92 
 (2.006) (1.637) (1.732) (1.452) 
(Dummy) Global Ultimate Ownership: Government -2.15 -1.11 -1.19 -0.44 
 (2.595) (2.024) (2.369) (2.297) 
(Dummy) Global Ultimate Ownership: Private entity -1.43 -0.90 -1.24 -1.27 
 (2.395) (1.805) (1.955) (2.004) 
Total outsider banks in country 0.30 -0.79 -1.51 -2.91* 
 (0.349) (0.943) (1.087) (1.318) 
Total insider banks in country 1.97* 2.90** 2.95** 4.21** 
 (0.981) (0.913) (1.041) (1.303) 
Percentage of Muslims in country -0.52+ -0.35* -0.26 0.09 
 (0.284) (0.174) (0.204) (0.183) 
GDP growth -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.12 
 (0.089) (0.140) (0.119) (0.126) 
Bank density 0.57+ 0.96*** 1.10** 0.98* 
 (0.337) (0.264) (0.342) (0.383) 
Constant -12.63 -25.02* -36.70* -68.88** 
 (18.733) (10.034) (14.828) (21.554) 
Log likelihood -56.06 -52.89 -51.36 -49.23 
Country and year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations (bank-year) 536 536 536 536 
Number of banks 66 66 66 66 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1     
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TABLE 6. Robustness checks 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
VARIABLES 
Mundlak  
procedure 
Insider-only  
countries 
Derivatives  
legitimacy 
Bank status 
Peer insider derivative use -1.02+ -3.21* -2.22* -2.22* 
 (0.575) (1.491) (1.007) (1.073) 
Outsider derivative use 1.19*  3.35** 4.37* 
 (0.462)  (1.236) (1.872) 
Outsider derivative use x outsider zakat payment -0.17**  -0.43* -0.37* 
 (0.063)  (0.168) (0.154) 
Outsider zakat payment 5.73***  6.26** 5.58** 
 (0.989)  (2.134) (2.081) 
Derivatives legitimacy   0.04  
   (2.986)  
Bank status    0.01 
    (0.004) 
Above outsider performance  14.42  44.94* 21.57 
 (7.775)  (18.316) (23.511) 
Below outsider performance  -2.23  3.68 0.63 
 (1.334)  (4.910) (3.256) 
Above insider performance  -0.92 -74.13 21.00 7.61 
 (7.737) (112.636) (13.222) (6.574) 
Below insider performance  -14.99+ 41.79*** -25.65 -25.58 
 (7.990) (7.213) (16.708) (16.170) 
Focal insider public listing -4.43*** 18.34*** -6.38** -6.75** 
 (1.109) (2.897) (2.244) (2.540) 
Focal insider payment of zakat -0.36 31.91+ -0.05 0.67 
 (0.344) (19.375) (0.996) (1.018) 
Insider zakat payment -1.45*** -10.00 -2.00** -1.77* 
 (0.337) (8.812) (0.731) (0.701) 
Profitability 0.32 -3.39 -0.42 -0.15 
 (0.285) (3.214) (0.536) (0.584) 
Size 3.56*** -7.48*** 3.03*** 3.32*** 
 (0.860) (1.566) (0.790) (0.940) 
Product count change -0.21 -1.83** -0.41 -0.43 
 (0.423) (0.639) (0.604) (0.695) 
Percentage of conventional F.I. ownership 0.23 27.16*** 13.82** 13.24* 
 (1.991) (6.356) (4.419) (5.553) 
Percentage of Islamic ownership -0.46 -6.10 -0.77 -0.54 
 (0.515) (4.225) (1.116) (1.392) 
(Dummy) Global Ultimate Ownership: Government 2.10** 2.12 1.06 -0.58 
 (0.744) (3.785) (1.674) (2.153) 
(Dummy) Global Ultimate Ownership: Private entity -2.04** -18.16** -2.37 -1.25 
 (0.628) (5.806) (2.106) (2.255) 
Total outsider banks in country -4.19*  -2.19* -3.26* 
 (0.780)  (1.017) (1.296) 
Total insider banks in country 2.92** 2.97** 4.92*** 4.66** 
 (0.770) (1.047) (1.423) (1.562) 
Percentage of Muslims in country 0.10+ -0.48*** -0.09 0.05 
 (0.051) (0.036) (0.194) (0.222) 
GDP growth -0.23*** -0.59 -0.20 -0.14 
 (0.068) (0.422) (0.140) (0.137) 
Bank density 0.99** 0.75 0.60** 0.98** 
 (0.355) (0.567) (0.219) (0.367) 
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Constant -34.50** 82.79*** -50.20** -65.45** 
 (11.599) (7.359) (17.173) (23.494) 
Log likelihood -34.39 -16.45 -43.01 -48.27 
Country and year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations (bank-year) 536 367 309 405 
Number of banks 66 35 58 59 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1     
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of CB-ownership Percentage in CB-owned Islamic banks (outsiders) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2, 3, and 4 
Counts of CB-owned and Full-Fledged Islamic Banks in Countries 
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FIGURE 5 
Hypothesis 3: Effect of Simultaneous Outsider Code Violation and Preservation on Focal 
Insider Code Violation 
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